Ingolf Dittmann
Ingolf Dittmann
Professor of Finance, Erasmus University Rotterdam
Verified email at ese.eur.nl - Homepage
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Lower salaries and no options? On the optimal structure of executive pay
I Dittmann, E Maug
The Journal of Finance 62 (1), 303-343, 2007
4022007
Bankers on the boards of German firms: What they do, what they are worth, and why they are (still) there
I Dittmann, E Maug, C Schneider
Review of Finance 14 (1), 35-71, 2010
2912010
Sticks or carrots? Optimal CEO compensation when managers are loss averse
I Dittmann, E Maug, O Spalt
The Journal of Finance 65 (6), 2015-2050, 2010
1792010
How important are risk-taking incentives in executive compensation?
I Dittmann, KC Yu, D Zhang
Review of Finance 21 (5), 1805-1846, 2017
1012017
Properties of nonlinear transformations of fractionally integrated processes
I Dittmann, CWJ Granger
Journal of Econometrics 110 (2), 113-133, 2002
952002
How fundamental are fundamental values? Valuation methods and their impact on the performance of German venture capitalists
I Dittmann, E Maug, J Kemper
European Financial Management 10 (4), 609-638, 2004
862004
Restricting CEO pay
I Dittmann, E Maug, D Zhang
Journal of Corporate Finance 17 (4), 1200-1220, 2011
832011
Selecting comparables for the valuation of European firms
I Dittmann, C Weiner
Available at SSRN 644101, 2005
712005
Biases and error measures: How to compare valuation methods
I Dittmann, E Maug
692008
Timing and wealth effects of German dual class stock unifications
I Dittmann, N Ulbricht
European Financial Management 14 (1), 163-196, 2008
582008
Residual‐Based Tests For Fractional Cointegration: A Monte Carlo Study
I Dittmann
Journal of Time Series Analysis 21 (6), 615-647, 2000
492000
Indexing executive compensation contracts
I Dittmann, E Maug, OG Spalt
The Review of Financial Studies 26 (12), 3182-3224, 2013
432013
Error correction models for fractionally cointegrated time series
I Dittmann
Journal of Time Series Analysis 25 (1), 27-32, 2004
302004
How reliable should auditors be?: optimal monitoring in principal–agent relationships
I Dittmann
European Journal of Political Economy 15 (3), 523-546, 1999
291999
The optimal use of fines and imprisonment if governments do not maximize welfare
I Dittmann
Journal of Public Economic Theory 8 (4), 677-695, 2006
282006
Fractional cointegration of voting and non-voting shares
I Dittmann
Applied Financial Economics 11 (3), 321-332, 2001
242001
Why votes have value: Instrumental voting with overconfidence and overestimation of others' errors
I Dittmann, D Kübler, E Maug, L Mechtenberg
Games and Economic Behavior 84, 17-38, 2014
232014
How Preussag became TUI: A clinical study of institutional blockholders and restructuring in Europe
I Dittmann, E Maug, C Schneider
Financial Management 37 (3), 571-598, 2008
192008
Measuring private benefits of control from the returns of voting and non-voting shares
I Dittmann
Available at SSRN 374001, 2003
132003
Bankers and the performance of German firms
I Dittmann, E Maug, C Schneider
Unpublished Work, 2005
82005
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