Contact rate epidemic control of COVID-19: an equilibrium view R Elie, E Hubert, G Turinici Mathematical Modelling of Natural Phenomena 15 (35), 1-25, 2020 | 54 | 2020 |
Mean–field moral hazard for optimal energy demand response management R Elie, E Hubert, T Mastrolia, D Possamaï Mathematical Finance 31 (1), 399-473, 2021 | 27 | 2021 |
Nash-MFG equilibrium in a SIR model with time dependent newborn vaccination E Hubert, G Turinici Ricerche di Matematica 67 (1), 227-246, 2018 | 14 | 2018 |
Incentives, lockdown, and testing: from Thucydides’ analysis to the COVID-19 pandemic E Hubert, T Mastrolia, D Possamaï, X Warin Journal of mathematical biology 84 (5), 1-48, 2022 | 8 | 2022 |
Continuous-time incentives in hierarchies E Hubert arXiv preprint arXiv:2007.10758, 2020 | 6 | 2020 |
Optimal contracts under adverse selection for staple goods such as energy: Effectiveness of in-kind insurance C Alasseur, C Chaton, E Hubert Energy Economics 106, 105785, 2022 | 1* | 2022 |
Interactions and incitatives: between contract theory and mean-field games E Hubert Paris Est, 2020 | | 2020 |