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Daniel Williams
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Predictive processing and the representation wars
D Williams
Minds and Machines 28 (1), 141-172, 2018
1412018
Socially adaptive belief
D Williams
Mind & Language 36 (3), 333-354, 2021
1072021
Hierarchical Bayesian models of delusion
D Williams
Consciousness and cognition 61, 129-147, 2018
842018
Predictive coding and thought
D Williams
Synthese 197 (4), 1749-1775, 2020
782020
From symbols to icons: The return of resemblance in the cognitive neuroscience revolution
D Williams, L Colling
Synthese 195, 1941-1967, 2018
742018
Motivated ignorance, rationality, and democratic politics
D Williams
Synthese 198 (8), 7807-7827, 2021
532021
The marketplace of rationalizations
D Williams
Economics & Philosophy 39 (1), 99-123, 2023
462023
Pragmatism and the predictive mind
D Williams
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (5), 835-859, 2018
372018
Signalling, commitment, and strategic absurdities
D Williams
Mind & Language 37 (5), 1011-1029, 2022
342022
Imaginative constraints and generative models
D Williams
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (1), 68-82, 2021
252021
Action, affordances, and anorexia: body representation and basic cognition
S Gadsby, D Williams
Synthese 195 (12), 5297-5317, 2018
242018
Is the brain an organ for free energy minimisation?
D Williams
Philosophical Studies 179 (5), 1693-1714, 2022
23*2022
Epistemic irrationality in the Bayesian brain
D Williams
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2021
222021
Hierarchical minds and the perception/cognition distinction
D Williams
Inquiry 66 (2), 275-297, 2023
142023
The mind as a predictive modelling engine: generative models, structural similarity, and mental representation
DG Williams
142018
Predictive minds and small-scale models: Kenneth Craik’s contribution to cognitive science
D Williams
Philosophical Explorations 21 (2), 245-263, 2018
122018
Bayesian Psychiatry and the Social Focus of Delusions
D Williams, M Montagnese
Expected Experiences, 257-282, 2023
52023
The case for partisan motivated reasoning
D Williams
Synthese 202 (3), 89, 2023
42023
Bad beliefs: why they happen to highly intelligent, vigilant, devious, self-deceiving, coalitional apes
D Williams
Philosophical Psychology 36 (4), 819-833, 2023
32023
To communicate scientific research, we need to confront motivated ignorance
D Williams
Impact of Social Sciences Blog, 2021
22021
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