| Maximum Nash welfare and other stories about EFX G Amanatidis, G Birmpas, A Filos-Ratsikas, A Hollender, AA Voudouris Theoretical Computer Science 863, 69-85, 2021 | 136 | 2021 |
| Fair division of indivisible goods: Recent progress and open questions G Amanatidis, H Aziz, G Birmpas, A Filos-Ratsikas, B Li, H Moulin, ... Artificial Intelligence 322, 103965, 2023 | 99 | 2023 |
| Fair division of indivisible goods: A survey G Amanatidis, G Birmpas, A Filos-Ratsikas, AA Voudouris arXiv preprint arXiv:2202.07551, 2022 | 98 | 2022 |
| Truthful allocation mechanisms without payments: Characterization and implications on fairness G Amanatidis, G Birmpas, G Christodoulou, E Markakis Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 545-562, 2017 | 87 | 2017 |
| Comparing approximate relaxations of envy-freeness G Amanatidis, G Birmpas, E Markakis arXiv preprint arXiv:1806.03114, 2018 | 77 | 2018 |
| On truthful mechanisms for maximin share allocations G Amanatidis, G Birmpas, E Markakis arXiv preprint arXiv:1605.04026, 2016 | 68 | 2016 |
| Peeking behind the ordinal curtain: Improving distortion via cardinal queries G Amanatidis, G Birmpas, A Filos-Ratsikas, AA Voudouris Artificial Intelligence 296, 103488, 2021 | 55 | 2021 |
| A few queries go a long way: Information-distortion tradeoffs in matching G Amanatidis, G Birmpas, A Filos-Ratsikas, AA Voudouris Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 74, 227–261-227–261, 2022 | 29 | 2022 |
| Coverage, matching, and beyond: new results on budgeted mechanism design G Amanatidis, G Birmpas, E Markakis Web and Internet Economics: 12th International Conference, WINE 2016 …, 2016 | 26 | 2016 |
| On budget-feasible mechanism design for symmetric submodular objectives G Amanatidis, G Birmpas, E Markakis Web and Internet Economics: 13th International Conference, WINE 2017 …, 2017 | 24 | 2017 |
| Fairness and efficiency in dag-based cryptocurrencies G Birmpas, E Koutsoupias, P Lazos, FJ Marmolejo-Cossío International conference on financial cryptography and data security, 79-96, 2020 | 21 | 2020 |
| Optimally deceiving a learning leader in stackelberg games G Birmpas, J Gan, A Hollender, F Marmolejo, N Rajgopal, A Voudouris Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 33, 20624-20635, 2020 | 19 | 2020 |
| Allocating indivisible goods to strategic agents: Pure nash equilibria and fairness G Amanatidis, G Birmpas, F Fusco, P Lazos, S Leonardi, R Reiffenhäuser Mathematics of operations research 49 (4), 2425-2445, 2024 | 18 | 2024 |
| Tight welfare guarantees for pure nash equilibria of the uniform price auction G Birmpas, E Markakis, O Telelis, A Tsikiridis Theory of Computing Systems 63, 1451-1469, 2019 | 13 | 2019 |
| Round-robin beyond additive agents: Existence and fairness of approximate equilibria G Amanatidis, G Birmpas, P Lazos, S Leonardi, R Reiffenhäuser Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 67-87, 2023 | 12 | 2023 |
| Don't roll the dice, ask twice: the two-query distortion of matching problems and beyond G Amanatidis, G Birmpas, A Filos-Ratsikas, A Voudouris Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 35, 30665-30677, 2022 | 11 | 2022 |
| Parallel contests for crowdsourcing reviews: existence and quality of equilibria G Birmpas, L Kovalchuk, P Lazos, R Oliynykov Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies …, 2022 | 7 | 2022 |
| Don’t Roll the Dice, Ask Twice: The Two-Query Distortion of Matching Problems and Beyond G Amanatidis, G Birmpas, A Filos-Ratsikas, AA Voudouris SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics 38 (1), 1007-1029, 2024 | 5 | 2024 |
| Cost-sharing models in participatory sensing G Birmpas, C Courcoubetis, I Giotis, E Markakis International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 43-56, 2015 | 5 | 2015 |
| Cost sharing over combinatorial domains: Complement-free cost functions and beyond G Birmpas, E Markakis, G Schäfer arXiv preprint arXiv:1910.06384, 2019 | 4 | 2019 |
Georgios AmanatidisDepartment of Informatics; Athens University of Economics and BusinessVerified email at aueb.gr
