| Persuasion of a privately informed receiver A Kolotilin, T Mylovanov, A Zapechelnyuk, M Li Econometrica 85 (6), 1949-1964, 2017 | 400 | 2017 |
| Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games P Dubey, O Haimanko, A Zapechelnyuk Games and Economic Behavior 54 (1), 77-94, 2006 | 275 | 2006 |
| Optimal allocation with ex-post verification and limited penalties T Mylovanov, A Zapechelnyuk American Economic Review 107 (9), 2666-2694, 2017 | 98* | 2017 |
| No-regret dynamics and fictitious play Y Viossat, A Zapechelnyuk Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2), 825-842, 2013 | 93 | 2013 |
| Optimal quality certification A Zapechelnyuk American Economic Review: Insights 2, 161-176, 2020 | 79 | 2020 |
| Censorship as optimal persuasion A Kolotilin, T Mylovanov, A Zapechelnyuk Theoretical Economics 17, 561-585, 2022 | 77 | 2022 |
| Persuasion meets delegation A Kolotilin, A Zapechelnyuk Econometrica 93 (1), 195-228, 2025 | 44 | 2025 |
| Optimal arbitration T Mylovanov, A Zapechelnyuk International Economic Review 54, 769-785, 2013 | 26* | 2013 |
| Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues E Kamenica, K Kim, A Zapechelnyuk Economic Theory 72, 701-704, 2021 | 17 | 2021 |
| Optimal fees in internet auctions A Matros, A Zapechelnyuk Review of Economic Design 12 (3), 155-163, 2008 | 14 | 2008 |
| Robust sequential search K Schlag, A Zapechelnyuk Theoretical Economics 16, 1431-1470, 2021 | 12* | 2021 |
| Better-reply dynamics with bounded recall A Zapechelnyuk Mathematics of Operations Research 33 (4), 869-879, 2008 | 11 | 2008 |
| Constructive versus toxic argumentation in debates T Mylovanov, A Zapechelnyuk American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 16 (1), 262-292, 2024 | 10* | 2024 |
| On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals A Zapechelnyuk Economic Theory 76, 1051-1067, 2023 | 10 | 2023 |
| Dynamic benchmark targeting KH Schlag, A Zapechelnyuk Journal of Economic Theory 169, 145-169, 2017 | 10* | 2017 |
| An axiomatization of multiple-choice test scoring A Zapechelnyuk Economics Letters 132, 24-27, 2015 | 9 | 2015 |
| Decision rules revealing commonly known events T Mylovanov, A Zapechelnyuk Economics Letters 119, 8-10, 2013 | 8 | 2013 |
| Optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator A Matros, A Zapechelnyuk International Journal of Industrial Organization 29 (4), 426-431, 2011 | 8* | 2011 |
| Eliciting information from a committee A Zapechelnyuk Journal of Economic Theory 148, 2049-2067, 2013 | 7 | 2013 |
| Compromise, don’t optimize: Generalizing perfect Bayesian equilibrium to allow for ambiguity K Schlag, A Zapechelnyuk Journal of Political Economy: Microeconomics 2 (1), 77-128, 2024 | 5* | 2024 |
Tymofiy MylovanovDepartment of Economics, University of PittsburghVerified email at pitt.edu
