Robert Gibbons
Robert Gibbons
Professor of Organizational Economics, MIT Sloan and Economics Department
Verified email at mit.edu
TitleCited byYear
Game theory for applied economists
RS Gibbons
Princeton University Press, 1992
27831992
Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
G Baker, R Gibbons, KJ Murphy
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 (1), 39-84, 2002
22662002
Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns: Theory and evidence
R Gibbons, KJ Murphy
Journal of political Economy 100 (3), 468-505, 1992
20921992
A primer in game theory
R Gibbons
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992
17551992
Subjective performance measures in optimal incentive contracts
G Baker, R Gibbons, KJ Murphy
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (4), 1125-1156, 1994
17271994
Relative performance evaluation for chief executive officers
R Gibbons, KJ Murphy
ILR Review 43 (3), 30-S-51-S, 1990
13311990
Incentives in organizations
R Gibbons
Journal of economic perspectives 12 (4), 115-132, 1998
12771998
Layoffs and lemons
R Gibbons, LF Katz
Journal of labor Economics 9 (4), 351-380, 1991
11441991
Learning and wage dynamics
HS Farber, R Gibbons
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 111 (4), 1007-1047, 1996
8991996
Four formal (izable) theories of the firm?
R Gibbons
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 58 (2), 200-245, 2005
7842005
Does unmeasured ability explain inter-industry wage differentials?
R Gibbons, L Katz
The Review of Economic Studies 59 (3), 515-535, 1992
6901992
Informal authority in organizations
G Baker, R Gibbons, KJ Murphy
Journal of Law, Economics, and organization 15 (1), 56-73, 1999
5821999
Dissolving a partnership efficiently
P Cramton, R Gibbons, P Klemperer
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 615-632, 1987
5451987
A theory of wage and promotion dynamics inside firms
R Gibbons, M Waldman
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (4), 1321-1358, 1999
5321999
Incentives between firms (and within)
R Gibbons
Management science 51 (1), 2-17, 2005
5052005
Careers in organizations: Theory and evidence
R Gibbons, M Waldman
Handbook of labor economics 3, 2373-2437, 1999
4561999
Cheap talk with two audiences
J Farrell, R Gibbons
Cambridge, Mass.: Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1989
4271989
Task-specific human capital
R Gibbons, M Waldman
American Economic Review 94 (2), 203-207, 2004
3802004
Incentives and careers in organizations
R Gibbons
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1996
3501996
Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
J Farrell, R Gibbons
Journal of economic theory 48 (1), 221-237, 1989
3301989
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