| Belief E Schwitzgebel Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2011 | 735 | 2011 |
| The unreliability of naive introspection E Schwitzgebel Philosophical Review 117 (2), 245-273, 2008 | 609 | 2008 |
| Expertise in moral reasoning? Order effects on moral judgment in professional philosophers and non‐philosophers E Schwitzgebel, F Cushman Mind & Language 27 (2), 135-153, 2012 | 497 | 2012 |
| A phenomenal, dispositional account of belief E Schwitzgebel Noûs 36 (2), 249-275, 2002 | 489 | 2002 |
| Perplexities of consciousness E Schwitzgebel MIT press, 2011 | 427 | 2011 |
| Describing inner experience?: proponent meets skeptic RT Hurlburt, E Schwitzgebel The MIT Press, 2007 | 357* | 2007 |
| Introspection, what E Schwitzgebel Introspection and consciousness, 29-48, 2012 | 349 | 2012 |
| Acting contrary to our professed beliefs or the gulf between occurrent judgment and dispositional belief E Schwitzgebel Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4), 531-553, 2010 | 329 | 2010 |
| Knowing that P without believing that P B Myers‐Schulz, E Schwitzgebel Noûs 47 (2), 371-384, 2013 | 228 | 2013 |
| Philosophers’ biased judgments persist despite training, expertise and reflection E Schwitzgebel, F Cushman Cognition 141, 127-137, 2015 | 216 | 2015 |
| In‐between believing E Schwitzgebel The Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202), 76-82, 2001 | 208 | 2001 |
| Do ethicists steal more books? E Schwitzgebel Philosophical Psychology 22 (6), 711-725, 2009 | 192 | 2009 |
| The moral behavior of ethics professors: Relationships among self-reported behavior, expressed normative attitude, and directly observed behavior E Schwitzgebel, J Rust Philosophical Psychology 27 (3), 293-327, 2014 | 171 | 2014 |
| A new measure of life satisfaction: The Riverside Life Satisfaction Scale S Margolis, E Schwitzgebel, DJ Ozer, S Lyubomirsky Journal of personality assessment, 2018 | 163 | 2018 |
| A dispositional approach to attitudes: Thinking outside of the belief box E Schwitzgebel New essays on belief: Constitution, content and structure, 75-99, 2013 | 132 | 2013 |
| How well do we know our own conscious experience? The case of visual imagery E Schwitzgebel Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6), 35-53, 2002 | 124 | 2002 |
| If materialism is true, the United States is probably conscious E Schwitzgebel Philosophical Studies 172, 1697-1721, 2015 | 122 | 2015 |
| Whose concepts are they, anyway? The role of philosophical intuition in empirical psychology A Gopnik, E Schwitzgebel Rethinking intuition, 75-91, 1998 | 117 | 1998 |
| Do You Have Constant Tactile Experience of Your Feet in Your Shoes?: Or Is Experience Limited to What's in Attention? E Schwitzgebel Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (3), 5-35, 2007 | 114 | 2007 |
| A defense of the rights of artificial intelligences E Schwitzgebel, M Garza Midwest Studies in Philosophy 39, 98-119, 2015 | 111 | 2015 |
Fiery CushmanPsychology, Harvard UniversityVerified email at fas.harvard.edu
