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Guy Fletcher
Guy Fletcher
Verified email at ed.ac.uk - Homepage
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
A Fresh Start for the Objective-List Theory of Well-Being
G Fletcher
Utilitas 25 (2), 206-20, 2013
2592013
The Philosophy of Well-Being: An Introduction
G Fletcher
Routledge, 2016
2072016
Current recommendations on the selection of measures for well-being
TJ VanderWeele, C Trudel-Fitzgerald, P Allin, C Farrelly, G Fletcher, ...
Preventive Medicine 133, 106004, 2020
1562020
Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Well-Being
G Fletcher
Routledge, 2016
1402016
Objective list theories
G Fletcher
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-being, 148-160, 2016
1172016
Moral Testimony: Once More With Feeling
G Fletcher
Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11, 45-73, 2016
592016
Having It Both Ways. Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics
G Fletcher, M Ridge
OUP USA, 2014
482014
The Locative Analysis of Good For Formulated and Defended
G Fletcher
JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 6 (1), 2012
422012
Sentimental Value
G Fletcher
The Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (1), 55-65, 2009
422009
Rejecting Well-Being Invariabilism
G Fletcher
Philosophical Papers 38 (1), 21-34, 2009
282009
VARIABLE VERSUS FIXED‐RATE RULE‐UTILITARIANISM
B Hooker, G Fletcher
The Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231), 344-352, 2008
282008
Pain for the moral error theory? A new companions-in-guilt argument
G Fletcher
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3), 474-482, 2018
222018
Dear Prudence: the nature and normativity of prudential discourse
G Fletcher
Oxford University Press, 2021
202021
The consistency of qualitative hedonism and the value of (at least some) malicious pleasures
G Fletcher
Utilitas 20 (4), 462, 2008
202008
Against Contextualism about Prudential Discourse
G Fletcher
The Philosophical Quarterly 69 (277), 699-720, 2019
162019
Moral Utterances, Attitude Expression, and Implicature
G Fletcher
Having it Both Ways: Hybrid Theories in Meta-Normative Theory, 2014
152014
Resisting buck-passing accounts of prudential value
G Fletcher
Philosophical studies, 1-15, 2011
142011
Taking Prudence Seriously
G Fletcher
Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14, 70-94, 2019
132019
Needing and necessity
G Fletcher
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 8, 170-192, 2018
122018
BROWN AND MOORE'S VALUE INVARIABILISM VS DANCY's VARIABILISM
G Fletcher
The Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238), 162-168, 2010
122010
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Articles 1–20