Guy Fletcher
Guy Fletcher
Verified email at ed.ac.uk - Homepage
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
A Fresh Start for the Objective-List Theory of Well-Being
G Fletcher
Utilitas 25 (2), 206-20, 2013
1632013
The Philosophy of Well-Being: An Introduction
G Fletcher
Routledge, 2016
1022016
Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Well-Being
G Fletcher
Routledge, 2016
742016
Objective list theories
G Fletcher
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-being, 148-160, 2016
522016
The Locative Analysis of Good For Formulated and Defended
G Fletcher
JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 6 (1), 2012
362012
Having It Both Ways. Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics
G Fletcher, M Ridge
OUP USA, 2014
352014
Moral Testimony: Once More With Feeling
G Fletcher
Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11, 45-73, 2016
312016
Current recommendations on the selection of measures for well-being
TJ VanderWeele, C Trudel-Fitzgerald, P Allin, C Farrelly, G Fletcher, ...
Preventive Medicine 133, 106004, 2020
302020
VARIABLE VERSUS FIXED‐RATE RULE‐UTILITARIANISM
B Hooker, G Fletcher
The Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231), 344-352, 2008
232008
Sentimental Value
G Fletcher
The Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (1), 55-65, 2009
212009
Pain for the moral error theory? A new companions-in-guilt argument
G Fletcher
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3), 474-482, 2018
192018
Rejecting Well-Being Invariabilism
G Fletcher
Philosophical Papers 38 (1), 21-34, 2009
192009
The consistency of qualitative hedonism and the value of (at least some) malicious pleasures
G Fletcher
Utilitas 20 (4), 462, 2008
172008
Resisting buck-passing accounts of prudential value
G Fletcher
Philosophical studies, 1-15, 2011
132011
Moral Utterances, Attitude Expression, and Implicature
G Fletcher
Having it Both Ways: Hybrid Theories in Meta-Normative Theory, 2014
112014
Mill, Moore, and Intrinsic Value
G Fletcher
Social Theory and Practice 34 (4), 517-532, 2008
102008
BROWN AND MOORE'S VALUE INVARIABILISM VS DANCY's VARIABILISM
G Fletcher
The Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238), 162-168, 2010
82010
Uneasy Companions
G Fletcher
Ratio 22 (3), 359-368, 2009
82009
A Millian Objection to Reasons as Evidence
G Fletcher
Utilitas 25 (03), 417-420, 2013
72013
Taking Prudence Seriously
G Fletcher
Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14, 70-94, 2019
62019
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Articles 1–20