Cooperation in a repeated prisoners' dilemma with ostracism
D Hirshleifer, E Rasmusen - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1989 - Elsevier
Abstract The unique Nash equilibrium of the finitely repeated n-person Prisoners' Dilemma
calls for defection in all rounds. One way to enforce cooperation in groups is ostracism:
players who defect are expelled. If the group's members prefer not to diminish its size, ...
calls for defection in all rounds. One way to enforce cooperation in groups is ostracism:
players who defect are expelled. If the group's members prefer not to diminish its size, ...
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